

Overview of Mahadev's Protocol for Classical Verification of Quantum Computation

PhD Interview - Technical Talk

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Quantum Computations

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- Optimization
- Factorization / Discrete Logarithms
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- Validation of Quantum Algorithms
- Verifying Quantum Supremacy
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
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Verifying quantum computations classically is not feasible

⇒ Mahadev's Protocol: Use cryptography and interact classically with the quantum computer

Short History Lesson

- 2004: Question whether a classical computer can verify the result of a quantum computation through interaction is raised.
- $BQP \subseteq PSPACE = IP$, but powerful prover
- What if the Prover has to be efficient?
- Approach 1: Verifier has access to small quantum computer (error-correcting codes)



- Approach 2: Play multiple provers against each other (CHSH)
- Can we verify by only interacting with one prover without small quantum computer?

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
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
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
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- What if we don't have access to trusted measurement device?

Mahadev's Protocol - Overview



- Measurement protocol: Classical verifier (BPP) using q. prover (BQP) as trusted measurement device
- Forces Prover to:
 - construct n qubit state of her choice
 - measure each qubit in Hadamard or Standard basis
 - report measurement result to verifier
- Soundness enforced based on LWE assumption: If verifier accepts, there exists a quantum state underlying the measurement result that is independent of the verifier's measurement choice

Commitment Phase

Definition (TCF+)

A function family $\mathcal{F} = \{f_{i,0}, f_{i,1} : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{D}\}$ is called TCF+ if

- there exists ppt $\text{Gen}_{\mathcal{F}}: (i, \text{td}_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\mathcal{F}}(1^\lambda)$
- $f_{i,0}, f_{i,1}$ injective with same image
- there exists ppt Inv that given $i, \text{td}_i, y \in \mathcal{D}$, finds both preimages: $(x_0, x_1) \leftarrow \text{Inv}(i, \text{td}_i, y)$
- adaptive Hardcore bit: $\forall d \neq 0 \forall \text{claws } (x_0, x_1)$ is hard to compute both $d \cdot (x_0 \oplus x_1)$ and a preimage x_0 or x_1 ; $\exists d$ s.t. $\forall \text{claws } (x_0, x_1)$ the bit $d \cdot (x_0 \oplus x_1)$ is the same and indistinguishable from uniform

approximate TCF+ can be built from LWE


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- The Verifier samples TCF+ functions and sends $f_{i,0}, f_{i,1}$ to the Prover.
- Prover entangles a quantum state of his choice with a claw $y = f_{i,0}(x_0) = f_{i,1}(x_1)$ and sends y to the verifier

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
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approximate TCF+ can be built from LWE

$$|\psi\rangle = \sum_{b \in \{0,1\}} \alpha_b |b\rangle \rightarrow \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{b \in \{0,1\}} \alpha_b |b\rangle |x\rangle |f_{i,b}(x)\rangle \xrightarrow{f_{i,b}(x)=y} \sum_{b \in \{0,1\}} \alpha_b |b\rangle |x_b\rangle = \text{Enc}(|\psi\rangle)$$



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
Challenge

TEST

- Verifier requests preimage (b, x_b) of y

$$\text{Enc}(|\psi\rangle) = \sum_{b \in \{0,1\}} \alpha_b |b\rangle |x_b\rangle$$

- ⇒ Prover can measure in standard basis and sends result to the prover



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
- ⇒ Prover can measure in standard basis and sends result to the prover

H-MEASURE

- Prover applies H to entire encoded state, measures second register and sends result r to the verifier

$$\text{Enc}(|\psi\rangle) \xrightarrow{H} X^{d \cdot (x_0 \oplus x_1)} H |\psi\rangle$$

- Verifier decodes measurement by XORing $d \cdot (x_0 \oplus x_1)$ to r



Standard Basis Measurement

Definition (TIF+)


A function family $\mathcal{G} = \{g_{i,0}, g_{i,1} : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{D}\}$ is called TIF+ if

- there exists ppt $\text{Gen}_{\mathcal{G}} : (i, \text{td}_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\mathcal{G}}(1^\lambda)$
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- there exists ppt $\text{Inv}_{\mathcal{G}}$ that given, $i, \text{td}_i, y \in \mathcal{D}$ finds preimage $x \leftarrow \text{Inv}_{\mathcal{G}}(i, \text{td}_i, y)$
- $(f_{i,0}, f_{i,1})$ computationally indistinguishable from $(g_{i,0}, g_{i,1})$

This acts as standard basis measurement:


$$|\psi\rangle = \sum_{b \in \{0,1\}} \alpha_b |b\rangle \rightarrow \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{b \in \{0,1\}} \alpha_b |b\rangle |x\rangle |g_{i,b}(x)\rangle$$

Given $y = g_{i,b}(x)$ the Verifier can reconstruct measurement result b using trapdoor



Verifier uses y to recover measurement result;
ignores Hadamard measurement result

Protocol - Overview



Verifier chooses basis:

- Hadamard: send TCF+ $(f_{i,0}, f_{i,1})$
- Standard: send TIF+ $(g_{i,0}, g_{i,1})$

Verifier either:

- tests state structure or
- request measurement result

⇒ Apply this protocol for every qubit in parallel

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Completeness


- Reduce problem to k -LOCAL-HAMILTONIAN
- Verifier chooses measurement basis
- Prover commits to ground state
- Prover measures honestly and sends measurement result
- Verifier can deduce that the committed state has low enough energy

Soundness

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


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- Conjugation of unitary U by random Pauli
- $(X^x Z^z)^\dagger U (X^x Z^z)$
- averaging over random Paulis \Rightarrow effect of Pauli

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
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
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- Verifier's decoding is $d \cdot (x_0 \oplus x_1)$
- Part of U acting on first register computationally randomized by initial state and Verifier's decoding
- $d \cdot (x_0 \oplus x_1)$ computationally indistinguishable from uniform \Rightarrow Use Pauli Twirl and U is simplified to Pauli
- U commutes with standard basis measurement $\Rightarrow U$ could have been applied before the commitment \Rightarrow measurement distribution equivalent to honest prover with committed state $|\psi'\rangle = U |\psi\rangle$

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- Make first message instance-independent in offline-step
- Use a parallel repetition theorem to run $3^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$ steps in 3 steps
- Fiat-Shamir \Rightarrow Non-interactive (QROM)
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[Bar+22] Succinct Classical Verification of Quantum Computation

- Succinct Key Generation based on iO / PPRF
- SNARGs in QROM

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⚡ Private coin, rewinding (nested rejection sampling)

- For NO instance: path of Verifier for two challenges correspond to nearly computational orthogonal projectors
- k -fold parallel repetition: each pair of distinct challenge tuples correspond to nearly orthogonal projectors
- Prover can only succeed in negligible fraction of challenge strings
- $\delta \rightarrow \delta^k$

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4. Fiat-Shamir
 - $c = \mathcal{H}(H_x, \text{pk}, y)$
 - QROM

Succinct classical verification of quantum computation

1. “Succinct batch key generation algorithm”
 - outputs short description of many (pk, sk) pairs
 - can be constructed from $iO + PPRFs$
 - compose succinct key generation with $TCF+$
2. provides template for succinct arguments for QMA

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- Complete, Soundness (reduce perfect attackers to trivial attackers)
- Application of parallel repetition, FS possible
- ZK possible
- Succinct arguments with succinct key generation based on iO / PPRF possible

References I

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